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WHIPLASH: WHO'S TO BLAME?
Valerie P. Hans & Juliet Dee'
Tom is sitting in his car at an intersection, waiting for the red light
to change. Without warning, the car behind him, driven by a
distracted mother named Elaine, slams into the rear of Tom's car.
After the accident, Tom experiences severe neck pain, which
interferes with his work and family life.
Who's to blame?
This straightforward account of a car accident is a
common story in today's legal landscape. It may seem
immediately obvious that Elaine, who drove her car into Tom's,
is the blameworthy party. If Tom suffered physical injury as a
result, then under current legal principles she is responsible for
compensating him for his injury. However, research on jury
decision making in civil cases suggests that a constellation of
psychological, legal and political factors operate together to
focus a surprising degree of attention, critical scrutiny, blame
and responsibility on Tom, our hypothetical victim.
Attention, blame, personal responsibility and legal
liability are conceptually distinct phenomena.' Attention does
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not necessarily lead to blame. Legal responsibility does not
attach to all morally blameworthy conduct. Yet, as a practical
matter, they are often intertwined. In reality, from both moral
and legal perspectives, not all plaintiffs are blameless and not
all defendants are culpable. For example, if we look at jury
verdicts as one measure of the defendant's legal culpability, we
find that plaintiffs win about half of their tort cases, including
60% of automobile accident cases.' Our interest is in analyzing
a striking tendency to blame the victims of personal injury,
even in instances where they are legally blameless. Therefore,
this Article focuses on the related phenomena of attention,
responsibility assessments, blame and legal judgments in the
context of the personal injury plaintiff.
In this Article, we describe the tendency for jurors to
focus on injury victims in their assessments of legal
responsibility. In Part I, we discuss recent empirical research
indicating this predilection in the larger context of personal
injury cases generally. In Part II, we explore this tendency by
focusing on attributions of responsibility and blame in
whiplash cases. This Part identifies three main factors that
cause jurors to focus on injury victims rather than defendants:
psychological factors, social and political norms, and media
coverage. In Part III, we propose and discuss the feasibility of
developing mechanisms to shift attention and blame away from
injury victims and back onto the perpetrators of accidents.
I. VICTIM BLAME AND DEROGATION IN PERSONAL INJURY
LAWSUITS
Perhaps no assumption about the civil jury is so
universally accepted as the belief that juries are highly
sympathetic to injured plaintiffs.' Opinion surveys, business
and insurance industry briefs and court opinions reflect beliefs
that juries naturally take the side of the injured plaintiff.4
RESPONSIBILITY, AND BLAMEWORTHINESS (1985); Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and
the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556, 557 (2000); M. Karlovac & John M.
Darley, Attribution of Responsibility for Accidents: A Negligence Law Analogy, 6 SOC.
COGNITION 287 (1988); PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND
BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
2 Brian J. Ostrom et al., A Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in
the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233, 235 (1996).
3 VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY 22-23 (2000).
4 Id.
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Research on civil juries, however, provides evidence that jurors
and the public are inclined to question the credibility and
claims of plaintiffs who bring personal injury lawsuits.' In
Valerie Hans's interviews with civil jurors who decided
lawsuits against businesses and corporations, many jurors
expressed hostility toward the plaintiffs who brought the
lawsuits, even when they eventually found for the plaintiffs.6
Jurors searched for ways that plaintiffs could have contributed
to their own injuries, and worried about trumped-up claims
and fraudulent or exaggerated injuries.! Jurors tended to
blame the victim, finding responsibility in injured persons and
their families, as well as the corporate defendants.8
A central task of the civil jury is to assess the competing
claims of the defendant and the plaintiff. However, in
retrospective accounts of their own decision making, the civil
jurors interviewed by Hans seemed to focus more on the
plaintiffs, and their scrutiny was often extraordinarily intense.
"Jurors' suspicions about plaintiffs' claims led them in most
cases to dissect the personal behavior of plaintiffs, with
seemingly no limits. Jurors criticized plaintiffs who did not act
or appear as injured as they claimed, those who did not appear
deserving, and those with preexisting or complicated medical
conditions."9 Juror interviews also reflected concerns about
money-hungry plaintiffs: "I just thought they felt they were
going to come into a big sum of money and just live the rest of
their life on easy street" or "I think, probably, looking at these
medical claims, [the plaintiff] said, 'well, maybe I can cash in
on this knee injury.""'
Of course, jurors' reactions to the plaintiffs in their
cases could have as much to do with the facts of the case and
the individual parties to the lawsuit as with jurors'
predispositions toward plaintiff blame. The factual
circumstances of the event, the causal actions of the defendant,
any contributory fault on the part of the plaintiff and the
presence of extenuating circumstances will figure centrally in
how jurors judge the responsibility for an accident. Yet, Neal
Id. See also NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: How JURORS THINK AND
TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS (2000).
6 HANS, supra note 3, at 22-49.
Id. at 22-33.
Id. at 22-49.
9 Id. at 28-29.
10 Id. at 29.
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Feigenson and his colleagues conducted experimental studies
confirming that, in certain cases, people ascribe some
responsibility to legally blameless plaintiffs."1 They conducted a
scenario experiment in which the plaintiffs' blameworthiness
varied between conditions. They found that, even when the
plaintiff was completely blameless as a legal matter, some
participants still held him accountable. For example, one
condition involved a worker who obeyed all the rules, and thus
did not appear to deserve blame, yet study participants judged
him to be 22% responsible for his accident.'2 In another
scenario, study participants allocated to a homeowner 14% of
the blame for injuries stemming from a faulty valve on a
propane gas tank in his home that was the property of the gas
13company.
Questions about credibility in individual personal injury
cases reflect larger doubts about the general merits of plaintiff
claims in civil litigation. Recent polls indicate that most people
believe that many lawsuits are worthless. In one recent
national survey, 92% of the respondents agreed with the
statement: "There are far too many frivolous lawsuits today."4
In fact, 76% of respondents said that they "strongly agreed"
with the statement, 5  suggesting an emotionally laden
endorsement. Beliefs in frivolous lawsuits are ubiquitous.
Public opinion polls expose a common concern about the
amount of illegitimate litigation today. 6 There is widespread
agreement among the public that many people who sue are not
negligently injured; instead, they are just trying to blame
others for their problems. 7 Plaintiff lawsuits are seen as
attempts to violate the important principle of individual
See FEIGENSON, supra note 5; Neal Feigenson et al., Effect of
Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on Attributions of Responsibility and Damage
Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 597, 610-12 (1997);
see also Feigenson et al., supra, at 600-01 (describing other research showing anti-
plaintiff bias). See also Douglas J. Zickafoose & Brian H. Bornstein, Double
Discounting: The Effects of Comparative Negligence on Mock Juror Decision Making, 23
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 577, 579 (1999).
12 Feigenson et al., supra note 11, at 611.
" Id. See also id. at 610-12 (discussing plaintiff blame).
14 Valerie P. Hans & Nicole Vadino, Whipped by Whiplash? The Challenges of
Jury Communication in Lawsuits Involving Connective Tissue Injury, 67 TENN. L. REV.
569 (2000).
" Id. at 572.
16 See studies cited in HANS, supra note 3, at 236-37 nn.16-18.
17 Hans & Vadino, supra note 14, at 572 (stating that 77% of national poll
respondents agreed that people who bring lawsuits are just trying to blame someone
else for their problems).
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personal responsibility. Indeed, President George W. Bush
recently exploited this widespread perception of frivolous
lawsuits in advocating his administration's plan to limit jury
awards in medical malpractice cases: "We're a litigious society,"
the President proclaimed, "[e]verybody is suing, it seems like."8
At the same time that members of the public believe
that jurors are highly sympathetic to civil plaintiffs, they hold
a concomitant view that fraud among claimants is rampant.
Respondents in one national poll estimated which was likely to
be more frequent, an insurance company denying a valid claim
or a person attempting to bring a fraudulent claim. Over half of
the poll respondents thought that an individual was more
likely to bring a fraudulent claim.1" Although the extent of
fraudulent claims is unknown, practitioners in the insurance
industry consider false claims a major problem. The Insurance
Research Council reported that people submitted $42 billion
worth of claims for auto accident injuries in 1997, and
estimated that as many as 40% of these claims ($16.8 billion)
could have been fraudulent." The Coalition Against Insurance
Fraud asserts on its Web site that insurance fraud is an $80
billion problem.2 It is difficult to assess the validity of these
estimates. A separate but related question is the extent to
which false legal claims result in lawsuits, since personal
injury attorneys provide an additional layer of scrutiny before
filing a lawsuit.
Whatever the accuracy of public perceptions about
frivolous or false litigation, jurors' general views about the
extent of frivolous lawsuits are related to how they assess an
individual plaintiffs claims. 2  For example, Hans's research
found that beliefs in a litigation explosion significantly related
to actual and mock juror judgments in civil disputes. Actual
is Richard A. Oppel, Jr., With a New Push, Bush Enters Fray Over
Malpractice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2003, at A24.
'9 Hans & Vadino, supra note 14, at 585.
'G Attack on Insurance Fraud, PATRIOT LEDGER (Quincy, Massachusetts),
Sept. 8, 1998, at 10.
2' The Coalition Against Insurance Fraud home page warns: "Watch out!
Insurance crooks are picking your pockets. Insurance fraud is an $80-billion crime
wave. It's driving up everyone's insurance prices . . . ." See Coalition on Fraud, at
http://www.insurancefraud.org (last visited Feb. 1, 2003). The Coalition Against
Insurance Fraud identifies itself as a national advocacy organization consisting of
insurance companies, consumer and public interest groups and government agencies
concerned with crime control. Members are listed at http://www.insurancefraud.org/-
member list.html.
22 See HANS, supra note 3, at 22-23.
109720031
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
and mock jurors who believed that there was a lot of frivolous
litigation were much more likely to question a plaintiffs
claims, a finding replicated in other studies.23
II. WHIPLASH CASES: "JURY JURY, HALLELUJAH!"
Once I had an accident-not too bad, just a little dent
A new Mercedes hit me from the rear
Man got out in a 3 piece suit & asked if a thousand dollars would do
I said, "Well, let me think for a minute here"
I'm gonna talk to my lawyer-I might have whiplash
I might have trauma-let's not talk petty cash
I've got a witness-to put a hand on the Bible
24
Jury jury, hallelujah-you might be liable.
The tendencies to question plaintiff credibility and to
wonder whether a plaintiff might be responsible for his or her
own injury are likely to be exacerbated in whiplash cases. As
singer and songwriter Chuck Brodsky suggests, whiplash cases
(or "whip-cash" cases) are commonly and even comically
equated with fraud. For example, in the situation comedy Yes,
Dear, when Greg's car just barely taps the car that Jimmy's
freeloading father is riding in, Jimmy's father blithely feigns a
crick in his neck: "Say, Greg, you have insurance, right? Gee, I
think I got some whiplash."25
The features of a typical whiplash case invite the
questioning of plaintiff credibility. A plaintiffs broken bone can
be seen in an X-ray, but whiplash and other soft-tissue injuries
do not manifest themselves on common medical tests. Instead,
the injuries are demonstrated primarily through the plaintiffs
claims about physical symptoms and problems stemming from
the injury. The lack of definitive medical testing means that
the plaintiffs and their credibility lie at the heart of the case.
23 Id. at 74-76. See also Edith Greene et al., Jurors' Attitudes About Civil
Litigation and the Size of Damage Awards, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 805 (1991) (finding lower
awards by mock jurors who supported tort reform); Shari Seidman Diamond et al.,
Juror Judgments about Liability and Damages: Sources of Variability and Ways to
Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 307-09 (1998) (finding that mock jurors
who believe plaintiffs receive too much in damages are less likely to hold the defendant
liable).
24 From the song Talk to my Lawyer by CHUCK BRODSKY, on LETTERS IN THE
DIRT (Red House Records 1996), reprinted with the permission of Chuck Brodsky.
Lyrics are available online at http://www.chuckbrodsky.com/lyrics.html. For full lyrics
and more information on the artist and his music, please see http://www.chuckbrod-
sky.com/music.html.
25 Yes, Dear: House of the Rising Son (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 13,
2003).
[Vol. 68: 41098
WHIPLASH: WHO'S TO BLAME?
General perceptions about the tendency of plaintiffs to bring
frivolous lawsuits, and beliefs that plaintiffs commonly and
easily fake whiplash injuries, are likely to have a more
pronounced effect in connective-tissue trials than in other types
of cases.
Some preliminary research shows that whiplash cases
are indeed problematic for plaintiffs and their attorneys." In a
focus group study, participants expressed substantial
skepticism about whiplash claims." One study reflected a
common theme of doubts about the validity of claims and the
exaggeration of injury: "Yeah, if you are in a car accident and
you sprain your thumb and now you can't flip the remote and
you want ten grand because you can't flip the remote for two
months, give me a break."28 Another participant voiced the
opinion, "I think we're a sue-happy society. And I think so
many people are out for what they can get from the insurance
company, from whoever .... 29
In addition, many participants did not know the
meaning of the common terms-including soft-tissue injury
and connective-tissue injury-that lawyers and medical experts
use to describe whiplash and other injuries in the courtroom."
The ambiguity surrounding connective-tissue injury seemed to
encourage focus group members to minimize and even dismiss
those injuries.3 A scenario experiment in a national poll
conducted by Hans and Nicole Vadino varied according to
whether a hypothetical plaintiff in an accident experienced a
broken bone or a connective-tissue injury, both of which a
doctor confirmed.32 Respondents were significantly more likely
to believe plaintiff claims of the broken bone.33 They saw the
broken bone as more serious than the connective-tissue injury,
even though the consequences of the injury were held
constant.34 Notably, people who reported that they, or a close
26 Valerie P. Hans, What Jurors Think About Connective Tissue Injuries,
TRIAL, July 2000 at 19; Hans & Vadino, supra note 14.
27 Hans & Vadino, supra note 14.
" Id. at 573.
Id. at 572-73.
30 Id. at 577-79.
31 Id.
32 Valerie P. Hans & Nicole Vadino, After the Crash: Citizens' Perceptions of
Connective-Tissue Injury Lawsuits (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).




friend or family member, had experienced whiplash were more
supportive of the plaintiff in the case.35
Yet, even if a jury believes that the plaintiff suffered a
connective-tissue injury, it may blame the plaintiff for that
injury. It may seem counterintuitive for a jury to blame the
victim rather than the person who caused the accident. Our
analysis, however, shows that there are potent psychological
motivations for attributing blame to victims of injury,
particularly in accident cases. We argue that these
psychological factors interact with other variables, including
social and political norms and media coverage, to encourage
jurors and lay observers to blame the victim.
A. Why Blame the Whiplash Victim? Psychological Factors
Psychologists have generated a substantial body of
empirical research indicating people do sometimes blame
victims for negative outcomes. The landmark work by
psychologist Melvin Lerner, as well as a body of experimental
research on attribution theory, provides ample evidence of
victim blaming.36 Lerner's original insight was that people's
need to believe in a just, predictable and controllable world
created considerable discomfort when they observed suffering.37
In response, people engaged in strategies to minimize their
own discomfort, including derogating innocent victims,
minimizing their injuries and reinterpreting injuries as victim-
precipitated.3" Lerner reasoned that, if we see another person
survive a negative event, such as being struck by a car, it is
psychologically more comforting to believe that that person did
something to cause it, rather than to believe that the event
occurred by chance.39 After all, if negative events are random,
they could easily befall us as well.
One strategy in blaming the victim is to attribute
unfortunate circumstances to a character flaw or other
35 Id. (manuscript at 17).
36 MELVIN LERNER, BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION
(1990); Howard Tennen & Glenn Affieck, Blaming Others for Threatening Events, 108
PSYCHOL. BULL. 209 (1990); SHAVER, supra note 1; BERNARD WEINER, AN
ATTRIBUTIONAL THEORY OF MOTIVATION AND EMOTION (1986); Sharon Lamb, The
Psychology of Condemnation: Underlying Emotions and their Symbolic Expression in
Condemning and Shaming, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 929 (2003).
31 See generally LERNER, supra note 36.
31 See generally id.
39 Id.
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negative feature of the victim. In his classic work from the
1950s, social psychologist Fritz Heider explained, "[t]he
relationship between goodness and happiness, between
wickedness and punishment is so strong, that given one of
these conditions, the other is frequently assumed. Misfortune,
sickness, and accident are often taken as signs of badness and
guilt."" We prefer to think that people who suffer deserved
their suffering for some reason.4 We can scrutinize the victim's
actions, and if no negligent action can be found, we might
derogate the person's character. Both strategies allow us to
distance ourselves, albeit unconsciously, from threatening
circumstances .42
The blame accorded to victims of sexual assault and
domestic violence illustrates this phenomenon in a criminal
justice setting.43 Psychologist Sharon Lamb argues, "[w]e do not
hold perpetrators responsible enough for the harms they inflict.
Perpetrators are masters at self-deception, blaming themselves
too little; victims blame themselves too much."" She
summarizes research studies on attributions of responsibility
in rape cases, which regularly find that people focus on the
rape victim, her characteristics and her actions in making
culpability judgments.45 Similarly, Regina Schuller has found
in her work on juries and battered women that juries focus on a
woman's character and actions in assessing blame,
responsibility and legal liability in battering incidents.46 The
theoretical underpinnings of this work help to explain why both
juries and the general public attribute blame to victims even
when it is unwarranted.
In analyzing the issue of victim blame, it is worth
examining the fundamental processes underlying the
attribution of responsibility. An attribution of responsibility
points to who can be held accountable for a positive or negative
40 FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 235 (1958).
41 SARAH TRENHOLM, PERSUASION AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 81 (1989).
42 Melvin J. Lerner & Carolyn H. Simmons, Observer's Reaction to the
"Innocent Victim": Compassion or Rejection?, 4 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203
(1966).
41 SHARON LAMB, THE TROUBLE WITH BLAME: VICTIMS, PERPETRATORS AND
RESPONSIBILITY (1996); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 204-14
(1986).
41 LAMB, supra note 43, at 8.
'5 Id. at 92-96.
46 Regina A. Schuller, The Impact of Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence on
Jury Decision Processes, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 597 (1992).
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event.47 Attributions of responsibility presuppose a judgment of
causality, 8 and attributions of blame presuppose judgments of
both causality and responsibility." In ascribing blame, a jury
must also eliminate acceptable excuses, rationalizations or
justifications."5
Mark Alicke's culpable control model of blame
delineates the conditions that increase as well as mitigate
blame.51 Alicke identifies three important components that
affect blame.52 They include volitional behavior control, that is,
whether a person's actions were freely chosen or compelled by
circumstance; causal control, which focuses on the actor's link
to the harmful consequence; and volitional outcome control, or
whether an actor desired or anticipated the specific outcomes. 3
Compared to an individual who knowingly chooses an action
with harmful consequences, a person who causes an accident is
less likely to be blamed because of low volitional behavior
control and low volitional outcome control.54 If jurors perceive
that the person who caused the accident had personal control
over the situation, this will intensify attributions of blame,
whereas if there were constraints on the person's control of the
situation, this will mitigate attributions of blame.55
Thus, juries are most likely to attribute responsibility
when (1) a particular person can be identified as the source of
the action; (2) the jurors believe the that person should have
foreseen the outcome of the action; (3) the person's actions were
unjustified by the situation; and (4) the person operated under
the condition of free choice. Suppose the brakes fail on a
private plane and it careens into a truck on the runway, killing
the truck driver. Would the pilot of the plane be held
responsible? He is most likely to be held responsible and
blameworthy if he was aware that his brakes were faulty and
he failed to have them checked. He is less likely to be held
4' Kelly G. Shaver, Defensive Attribution: Effects of Severity and Relevance on
Responsibility Assigned for an Accident, 14 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 101
(1970).
48 Kathleen M. McGraw, Conditions for Assigning Blame: The Impact of
Necessity and Sufficiency, 26 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 109 (1987).
49 SusAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 83-84 (1991).
50 Alicke, supra note 1, at 557.
5' See generally Alicke, supra note 1.
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responsible if he did not know of, and could not have known of,
the mechanical failure in the plane's brakes that caused the
accident. In other words,
an attribution of blameworthiness is typically reserved for cases in
which a causal agent is regarded as subject to censure or
punishment for a negative event. A jury would tend to attribute
blame only when an actor is seen as intending to produce an
outcome, and achieving a negative outcome was the actor's
56
purpose.
The culpable control theory proposes that accidents,
because they typically are not foreseen, may be less likely to
engender strong blaming of the individual who causes the
accident. That supplies one piece of the puzzle of plaintiff
blame in automobile accident cases. In looking for fault,
observers may not be strongly motivated to blame the
defendant, since the accident was not intended and the
outcome was not foreseen. Other pieces of the puzzle fall into
place when we consider the phenomenon, uncovered by
psychological research, of defensive attribution. When an
observer evaluates the responsibility of another individual,
attributional processes may take on a defensive posture if the
person is highly similar to the observer and is in a situation
that the observer might also experience." Defensive attribution
processes may encourage people to hold responsible for
negative outcomes actors whose behavior has linked them to
negative outcomes, even when the actors have not caused those
outcomes." If people are motivated to distance themselves from
the possibility that an accident could happen to them, they may
adjust their responsibility judgments of others so that the
subjective likelihood of an accident occurring is low, or at least
so that no one would blame them for the consequences." Two
factors have been associated with the tendency toward
defensive attribution: the similarity of the observer to the actor
and the severity of the injury. We take up each of them.
56 FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 83-84.
57 SHAVER, supra note 1, at 134-35.
58 Dretha M. Phillips, Defensive Attribution of Responsibility in Juridic
Decisions, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 483, 498 (1985).
59 Neil Vidmar & L.D. Crinklaw, Attributing Responsibility for an Accident, 3
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 73 (1974).
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1. The Role of Similarity in Defensive Attributions
Kelly Shaver hypothesized that situational and personal
similarities facilitate defensive attribution.0 Shaver argued
that if an observer is never going to find herself in a situation
like that of the actor who caused the accident (low situational
similarity: she does not drive, so she would never be guilty of
hitting the car in front of her), the accident may not arouse a
great deal of defensiveness.61 But if the observer is likely to be
in a similar situation (high situational similarity: she does
drive), her defensiveness could be aroused and she may
attempt to deny personal similarity to the actor.62 If personal
similarity to the actor is high, Shaver predicts that the
observer might also look for other distancing strategies.63 The
observer may attribute the accident to chance or bad luck, or
minimize resulting injuries.64 Indeed, in research studies,
Shaver found that observers rating the responsibility of a
person with similar personal characteristics to themselves are
more lenient, compared to their rating of a person with
dissimilar personal characteristics to themselves.65
In twenty-two studies testing the defensive attribution
hypothesis, J. M. Burger found support for Shaver's predictions
about the role of similarity.66 When subjects were personally
and situationally similar to the person who caused the
accident, they attributed less responsibility to that actor,
particularly as the severity of the consequences increased.
When subjects were situationally or personally dissimilar to
the actor, they attributed more responsibility to the actor as
the accident's severity increased.67 Presumably, these defensive
60 Shaver, supra note 47.
61 Kelly G. Shaver, Redress and Conscientiousness in the Attribution of
Responsibility for Accidents, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 100 (1970).
62 Id.
63 Id.
Shaver, supra note 47.
65 Id.
6 J.M. Burger, Motivational Biases in the Attribution of Responsibility for an
Accident: A Meta-analysis of the Defensive Attribution Hypothesis, 90 PSYCHOL. BULL.
496(1981).
67 Id. See also Dongo Rbmi Kouabenan, Degree of Involvement in an Accident
and Causal Attribution, 7 J. OCCUPATIONAL ACCIDENTS 187 (1985); Dongo Rmi
Kouabenan et al., Hierarchical Position, Gender, Accident Severity, and Causal
Attribution, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 553 (2001); Simo Salminen, Defensive
Attribution Hypothesis and Serious Occupational Accidents, 70 PSYCHOL. REP. 1195
(1992).
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attributions served to deflect the threatening implications for
the subjects.
Bill Thornton and his colleagues have also found that
the more personally similar observers are to the victim, the
greater the observers' motivation to engage in defensive
attribution.68 Arguably, jurors most likely to "blame the victim"
are those who have the most in common with the victim or
plaintiff.69 Donald Vinson explains, "[i]n the jurors' minds,
blaming the victim reduces the chances that they too will suffer
a similar fate. Jurors confronted with the details of a terrible
injury want to conclude that 'this wouldn't happen to me.'""
What would Shaver's theory predict in the typical
whiplash case? Most jurors across the country drive
automobiles, and automobile accidents are very frequent,
suggesting high situational similarity for the vast majority of
jurors. Personal similarity to the defendant or the victim could
play a key role. In our hypothetical whiplash case, in which
Elaine hits Tom from behind, a young mother sitting on the
jury might be most inclined toward leniency for Elaine and
fault-finding, derogation or injury minimization for Tom.
Interestingly, research on people's reactions to whiplash
cases suggests that direct experience with whiplash is
positively and significantly related to perceptions about
whiplash plaintiffs." In one public opinion poll, 44% of
respondents reported that they themselves, a close friend or a
family member thought they had experienced whiplash.7" Those
who said they had some firsthand experience with whiplash
were more likely to grant it legitimacy.73 Fully 40% of
respondents with whiplash experience said that people who
claimed whiplash were "usually" or "always" injured, in
contrast to only 20% of the respondents without whiplash
71experience.
Bill Thornton et al., Physiological Evidence of an Arousal-Based
Motivational Bias in the Defensive Attribution of Responsibility, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 161 (1986).
69 DONALD E. VINSON, JURY PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGIES AND
TRIAL TECHNIQUES 97 (1993).
70 Id.






2. The Role of Accident Severity in Defensive
Attributions
Injury severity also may affect judgments of blame,
responsibility and legal liability. The tendency to engage in
defensive attribution appears to intensify as the consequences
of an action increase in severity. The more serious the injury
from an accident, the greater is the bystander's need to engage
in defensive attribution.75 In a meta-analysis of seventy-five
studies, Jennifer Robbennolt concluded that people attribute
greater responsibility for the outcome of a negative incident
when that outcome is more severe than when the outcome is
minor.76 More severe injuries are more likely to lead to
compensation.77
The fact that whiplash injuries are relatively minor
raises the question of the extent to which observers are
psychologically motivated to engage in defensive attribution.
Defensive attribution motives may be entirely absent. Further,
because the whiplash injury is relatively minor, people may be
psychologically comfortable calling it an accident that is no
one's fault. Unfortunately, the research does not clearly
indicate the level of psychological pressure to engage in
defensive attribution faced by jurors in whiplash cases.
Viewing the problem from an angle that contradicts the
just world and defensive attribution phenomena, we observe
that jurors have an easy avenue for relieving any personal
discomfort in observing the plaintiffs suffering-they can hold
the defendant liable and provide a generous compensatory
award for the plaintiff. In Valerie Hans's research with civil
jurors, however, she found a substantial amount of plaintiff
criticism and blame, even in cases in which the jury ultimately
found for the plaintiff.78
75 Elaine Walster, Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident, 3 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 73 (1966).
76 Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Outcome Severity and Judgments of
"Responsibility": A Meta-Analytic Review, 30 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2575, 2601
(2000).
77 Roselle L. Wissler et al., Explaining "Pain and Suffering" Awards: The
Role of Injury Characteristics and Fault Attributions, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 181
(1997). See also Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decision-making About General Damages: A
Comparison of Jurors, Judges and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751 (1999); Troyen A.
Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the Outcomes of
Medical-Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1963 (1996).
78 HANS, supra note 3.
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B. Social and Political Factors Affecting Plaintiff Blame
In addition to psychological factors, social norms and
political issues encourage people to hold personal injury
plaintiffs responsible. Perhaps no social norm is more strongly
held in the United States than the ethic of individualism, with
its emphasis on individual responsibility and freedom.79 In an
insightful early study of people's reactions to civil lawsuit
plaintiffs, Professor David Engel conducted interviews with
residents of a rural Illinois community in the 1970s.8" He
discovered that the community members had negative views of
plaintiffs who brought personal injury lawsuits.8 The residents
saw these plaintiffs as troublemakers who would not accept
responsibility for their own actions." They viewed the plaintiffs
as attempting to blame others, undermining the community's
strong commitment to personal individual responsibility.83 In
the eyes of the community, those who suffered personal injuries
were usually at fault in some way, and would have been able to
prevent their injuries had they been more careful.
Similarly, Professor Robert Hayden maintains that
society perceives, rightly or wrongly, plaintiffs who bring legal
claims against other individuals or against corporate entities
as violating important social norms.8 In addition to the norm of
personal responsibility, Hayden points to the way that some
citizens may see civil lawsuits as violating the social norms of
equality and wealth redistribution.85 Individual litigants use
the state's resources to bring a lawsuit, lessening the formal
equality between the parties as the machinery of justice is used
on behalf of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
Furthermore, a monetary compensatory award for an injury
gives a financial benefit without a plaintiff having to work for
it, much as welfare recipients are seen as receiving financial
79 ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
'0 David M. Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal
Injuries in an American Community, 18 LAW & SOC REV. 551, 556-58 (1984).
SI Id. at 553-54, 559-60.
82 Id. at 553.
83 Id. at 558-59.
Robert M. Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis: Common Sense,
Hegemony and the Great American Liability Insurance Famine of 1986, 11 STUD. L.




benefits without work. 6  These perceived advantages,
inequalities and benefits for the civil plaintiff may create
hostility.
Some political realities also help to shape contemporary
views of the plaintiff in a civil lawsuit. Many lawsuits today pit
an individual plaintiff against a business or corporate
defendant.87 The National Center for State Courts reports that
in forty-five of the largest state courts, over half of the civil jury
trials included a corporation as a defendant.88 Some major
corporations, along with insurance companies, have pointed to
the high cost of fraudulent claims and supposedly frivolous
litigation to support their civil justice reform efforts, which are
aimed at limiting their legal liabilities.89 These efforts have
succeeded in many state courts.9° Part of the secret of their
success, we believe, is the skewed media coverage that shapes
public views of civil litigation.
C. Media Coverage
Media coverage of excessive litigation, combined with
negative views that whiplash is a fraudulent injury could
create initially negative impressions of the whiplash plaintiff
that, in turn, could shape the jury's liability judgments. Media
coverage and advertising campaigns could be potent influences
in framing how the public perceives legal claims.9 Most people
obtain information about legal proceedings through television,
newspapers, magazines and other media.92
86 Id.
87 HANS, supra note 3, at 10.
Ostrom et al., supra note 2, at 237.
89 See the following exchange for divergent views of insurance company
political efforts: Stephen Daniels, The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of
Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric, and Agenda-Building, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 269; and Judyth W. Pendell, Enhancing Juror Effectiveness:
An Insurer's Perspective, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Autumn 1989, at 311.
90 THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 71-80
(2001).
"' Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, News Media Reporting
on Civil Litigation and Its Influence on Civil Justice Decision Making, 27 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 5 (2003).
92 Valerie P. Hans & Juliet L. Dee, Media Coverage of Law: Its Impact on
Juries and the Public, 35 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 136, 137 (1991). Media reporting of
criminal cases overrepresents serious and violent crime, providing a biased picture of
crime frequency. Nancy Signorielli, Television's Mean and Dangerous World: A
Continuation of the Cultural Indicators Perspective, in CULTIVATION ANALYSIS: NEW
DIRECTIONS IN MEDIA EFFECTS RESEARCH 85-106 (Nancy Signorielli & Michael Morgan
eds., 1990); DAVID J. KRAJICEK, SCOOPED!: MEDIA MISS REAL STORY ON CRIME WHILE
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Media coverage of civil litigation presents an inaccurate
and sensationalist picture of civil lawsuits. Daniel Bailis and
Robert MacCoun's systematic analysis of media stories about
tort litigation in popular national magazines from 1980 to 1990
found that magazines devoted disproportionately high
attention to big award cases. 93 For example, median jury
awards ranged from a low of $51,000 in state court tort trials to
a high of $318,000 in federal products liability cases. Yet, the
median jury award in cases discussed in the magazine articles
was $1,750,000. 9' The media also favor heavy coverage of the
lawsuit "horror story." Whether it is a woman who spills coffee
on herself and wins a $2.9 million jury award from
McDonald's,"9 a Philadelphia "psychic" who wins a $1 million
jury award after a botched medical treatment 96 or a bystander
who sees a car hit a bus and then hops on the bus in order to
fraudulently claim a whiplash injury, media coverage of these
and other horror story cases provides familiar and readily
available exemplars of the excesses of our civil justice system.97
Advertising campaigns by businesses and insurance
companies also promote the ready availability of horror stories.
Stephen Daniels analyzed insurance advertisements that
called attention to seemingly questionable lawsuits 98One
Aetna Insurance ad read:
The right to sue is as essential to a free and fair country as any right
guaranteed in the Constitution. But when a woman riding in an
automobile spills hot coffee on her lap, then sues the restaurant
where she bought the coffee, something is wrong. And when a man
CHASING SEX, SLEAZE AND CELEBRITIES (1998).
93 Daniel S. Bailis & Robert J. MacCoun, Estimating Liability Risks with the
Media as Your Guide: A Content Analysis of Media Coverage of Tort Litigation, 20 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 419 (1996).
94 Id. at 426.
95 William Glaberson, Ideas and Trends: The $2.9 Million Cup of Coffee, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 1999, at D1. Glaberson observed that although the media raised a hue
and cry over the $2.9 million jury award, far less media attention was devoted to the
fact that the woman who spilled the coffee was eighty-one years old and the coffee
scalded her so badly that she needed skin grafts for third-degree burns. There were
also far fewer media reports when the woman settled for $600,000 after the judge
reduced her jury award. See generally Michael McCann et al., Java Jive: Genealogy of a
Judicial Icon, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 113 (2001).
Galberson, supra note 95. Although a jury awarded the "psychic" $1
million, Glaberson pointed out that the media barely reported the fact that the
psychic's verdict was reversed and she collected nothing at all. Id.
97 See, e.g., McCann et al., supra note 95.
9' See Daniels, supra note 89.
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can drag a liquor company into court because he has become an
alcoholic, something is wrong.
99
Fraudulent claims of whiplash and other soft-tissue
injuries in accidents have been exposed in high-profile news
stories. For example, in 2001, the New York State Insurance
Department conducted an investigation, dubbed "Operation
Whiplash," which exposed an insurance fraud ring that created
fake accidents and injury claims and ripped off insurance
companies for millions of dollars.' 0 In another highly publicized
series of incidents, the fraud division of the New Jersey
Insurance Department staged a sting operation using fake bus
accidents.' They were concerned about the phenomenon of
"ghost riders," people near a public transit vehicle who hop
aboard after an accident and then submit false injury claims.'
The sting operation staged a number of false bus accidents and
filmed the events. They were then able to catch bogus
claimants and some of their doctors and lawyers.'
These widely publicized insurance fraud cases no doubt
contribute to negative schemata toward plaintiffs in whiplash
cases. TM As jurors begin their task of apportioning legal
responsibility, these examples may help to shape their views of
the plaintiff in the case before them. Jurors may be more alert
for evidence of fraud, but they may also be more suspicious of
legitimate injury claims.
III. SHIFTING BLAME BACK TO THE DEFENDANT
The psychological literature suggests that plaintiff
blame, derogation and injury minimization will be a common
occurrence in personal injury lawsuits, resulting in a possible
disinclination to hold a defendant responsible for the plaintiffs
injury. Focus. group results and the national survey on
whiplash also indicate that whiplash cases present distinctive
9 Id. at 288.
100 Celeste Katz, Insurers Lose Big to Fraud Ring Scam, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Feb. 12, 2002, at 53.
101 Jerry DeMarco, A Surprise for New Jersey in Insurance Sting: 2 Cops
Among More than 100 Accused, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Aug. 19, 1993, at Al.
10' Two Cops, Doctor Indicted in Phony Bus Accident, RECORD (Bergen
County, N.J.), Aug. 18, 1993, at A4.
'o' Coalition Lists Top Insurance Scams of'93, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL,
Jan. 12, 1994; Peter Kerr, "Ghost Riders" Are Target of an Insurance Sting, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 18, 1993, at A3.
104 Robbennolt & Studebaker, supra note 91, at 17.
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problems. 105 The relatively low severity of many whiplash
injuries may lessen the jury's need to find a defendant
responsible. The extensive publicity and high visibility of
insurance fraud cases may present challenges even for
plaintiffs with meritorious cases to convince a jury that their
injuries are real and deserve compensation.
Having documented the problem and having outlined
some of the psychological and social processes that underlie it,
we ask whether it is possible to do anything to correct it. That
is, can we modify the arguments and evidence presented in a
trial so that jurors are more likely to believe and compensate a
deserving plaintiff? In a whiplash case, can we shift blame
away from the plaintiff and back onto the defendant? How can
we effectively communicate the severity of a whiplash injury
and ensure adequate compensation?
Trial handbooks and communication and psychology
treatises on effective communication and persuasion can
inform our inquiry on trial tactics. °6 We do not aim to survey
that voluminous literature here, although we draw on its
insights. Instead, we focus on a set of questions, identifying two
key areas for fruitful exploration: blame shifting from plaintiff
to defendant, and the communication of injury validity and
severity. In proposing relevant strategies, we draw on the work
of major psychological researchers, communication scholars,
persuasion theorists and lawyers.
A. Influencing Jurors' Attitudes
First, we begin with the insight that jurors' attitudes
toward the issue of personal injury litigation and even
whiplash will be based on their beliefs and values, the building
blocks of attitudes."' Attitudes about related issues linked
,' Hans & Vadino, supra note 14, at 573-77.
106 W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN
THE COURTROOM (1981); THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES
(1980); INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING (Reid Hastie
ed., 1993); SONYA HAMLIN, WHAT MAKES JURIES LISTEN TODAY (1998); John C.
Reinard, Persuasion in the Legal Setting, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 543 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau
eds., 2002); HERBERT W. SIMONS, PERSUASION IN SOCIETY (2001); PERSUASION:
ADVANCES THROUGH META-ANALYSIS (Mike Allen & Raymond W. Preiss eds., 1998)
[hereinafter ADVANCES]; COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE PROCESSES (Charles
R. Berger & Michael Burgoon eds., 1995).
107 SIMONS, supra note 106, at 27.
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together form a knowledge structure or schema.' °8 A relevant
example is a schema of frivolous and fraudulent plaintiffs
bringing sham lawsuits. Once formed, schemata are resistant
to change, but it is sometimes possible to alter schemata if
individuals are receptive to new information. The first small
step in the persuasive process is providing new information
that will change a juror's negative schemata about the plaintiff.
Framing is another approach to effective persuasion. "A
frame . . . is one among a number of possible ways of seeing
something, and a refraining is a way of seeing it differently, in
effect changing its meaning."'09 Attorneys might try to frame or
reframe an argument in such a way as to cause jurors to alter
their pre-existing schemata. For example, successful reframing
occurred in a survey of respondents who were generally
opposed to the federal welfare program called Aid to Families
with Dependent Children ("AFDC")." ° If researchers told the
survey respondents that federal spending on welfare was about
1% of the annual federal budget, they thought that it was a
small amount and were far more favorable toward welfare."' In
contrast, if researchers told survey respondents the actual
amount in dollar figures (over $10 billion), they expressed
alarm at the amount spent on welfare." 2
Another approach to predicting how jurors might react
to an argument is the Elaboration Likelihood Model ("ELM") of
persuasion developed by Richard Petty and John Cacioppo.1
Petty and Cacioppo differentiate between circumstances that
encourage central processing of information, that is, systematic
analysis of the content of a persuasive argument, and
peripheral processing of information, which relies more on
shortcuts and heuristics to evaluate the validity of a persuasive
message.114
108 Id. at 26.
'0' Id. at 120.
110 J.H. Kuklinski & P.J. Quirk, Political Facts and Public Opinion, Paper
presented at the University of Pennsylvania conference on "The Future of Fact" (Feb.
26-28, 1997), cited in SIMONS, supra note 106, at 33.
III Id.
112 Id.
113 RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND
PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE (1986); Richard
E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion, in 19
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 123 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1986).
114 RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, ATTITUDES AND PERSUASION:
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES 257 (1996).
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In one study, Richard Petty, John Cacioppo and Richard
Goldman found that listeners with a high degree of personal
involvement in an issue were more persuaded by strong, as
opposed to weak, arguments and were less concerned with the
communicator's degree of expertise."' In contrast, they found
that listeners with a low degree of personal involvement in an
issue were less concerned with the strength or weakness of
various arguments, but were more persuaded by a speaker who
they perceived to have high, rather than low, expertise on the
subject."6 Highly complex material appears to have a similar
effect in shifting people from central to peripheral processing,
at least in laboratory experiments. 117
Predictably, jurors, given the significant consequences
of their decision, will be highly motivated to engage in central
processing of the evidence. Trial consultant Donald Vinson,
however, maintains that jurors also rely on heuristics or
shortcuts to simplify their task, especially in complex trials.' s
In some instances, reliance on heuristics may decrease the
accuracy of decision making."9  The representativeness
heuristic, for example, leads jurors to estimate the probability
of an event from the ease with which particular examples come
to mind.' The widespread publicity given to frivolous litigation
and insurance fraud stories may make it easy for jurors to
recall specific instances, which in turn may increase their
estimate of how often frivolous and fraudulent lawsuits are
filed. Plaintiffs' attorneys should anticipate that fraud cases
will be readily available in jurors' memories and should
confront the matter directly.
Vinson explains how to identify affective and cognitive
approaches in jurors. 2' An affective juror is one who "makes
decisions on an emotional rather than a rational basis.
.". Richard E. Petty et al., Personal Involvement as a Determinant of
Argument-Based Persuasion, 41 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 847 (1981).
116 Id.
117 Joel Cooper & Isaac M. Neuhaus, The "Hired Gun" Effect: Assessing the
Effect of Pay, Frequency of Testifying, and Credentials on the Perception of Expert
Testimony, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (2000). But see Brief of Amici Curiae Neil
Vidmar et al., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (No. 97-1709)
(arguing that the empirical evidence including judge-jury agreement studies, case
studies and experimental research does not show conclusively that juries are unable to
assess expert testimony or that they uncritically defer to experts).
118 VINSON, supra note 69, at 63.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 60.
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Affective jurors are generally impulsive decision makers. They
often base their decisions on highly selective perception and
organization of what they see and hear, rather than reserving
judgment until all the facts have been gathered." 2 In contrast,
cognitive jurors are "very orderly and logical decision-makers,
information seekers because they are information
processors." 2' Affective jurors tend to remember 4 and respond
to emotional appeals.' Focusing on how an injury affected the
plaintiffs ability to participate in family life has more
emotional impact than does documentation of a plaintiffs lost
wages. Vinson concludes, "[s]uccessful plaintiff personal injury
lawyers are . . . masters at structuring affective
communications. At the same time, most defense lawyers
adhere to a highly structured cognitive approach."'26 Yet, if
jurors respond to diverse appeals, attorneys on both sides
would do well to include both affective and cognitive appeals.
Persuasion researchers have found some evidence that
listeners are most persuaded when they believe that the
speaker is actually arguing against her own belief or position.
12 7
Listeners tend to form prior beliefs regarding the position that
the witness is likely to take. If the witness' message is then
seen as the opposite of the prior position, the witness gains
credibility and, thus, is more persuasive. 12 Interestingly,
whiplash cases sometimes put the defendant in a position to
benefit from this phenomenon. If a defendant admits liability
but disputes damages, a frequent occurrence in rear-end
automobile accidents, the admission of liability may enhance
her credibility.
B. Addressing Defensive Attributions at Trial
The attribution literature suggests that the perceptions
of personal control and individual self-determination are
strongly linked to judgments of responsibility. Thus, the most
powerful strategy for shifting responsibility and blame away
from a plaintiff and toward a culpable defendant is to frame or
122 Id.
123 VINSON, supra note 69, at 61.
124 KATHLEEN KELLEY REARDON, PERSUASION IN PRACTICE 132 (1991).
125 GERRY SPENCE, HOW TO ARGUE AND WIN EVERY TIME 180 (1995).
126 VINSON, supra note 69, at 62.
12' Alice H. Eagly et al., An Attribution Analysis of Persuasion, in 3 NEW
DIRECTIONS IN ATTRIBUTION RESEARCH 37 (John H. Harvey et al. eds., 1981).
128 Id.
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reframe the issue of individual responsibility, emphasizing the
factual circumstances that constricted the plaintiffs personal
control and expanded the defendant's personal control. As
described above, if the plaintiff had any possible way of
influencing the outcome of the situation, jurors exhibit strong
tendencies to blame the plaintiff. In our hypothetical case,
despite the fact that Elaine's fault seems more direct and
obvious, if Tom could have moved his car as he saw Elaine
hurtling toward him in his rear-view mirror, jurors will likely
blame him for failing to avoid the accident. Based on the
psychological and social phenomena explained above, we
should expect at least a modest degree of belief that Tom is at
fault, even if it is clear that he had no warning or personal
control over the situation. Nonetheless; we think that
emphasizing the plaintiffs inability to avoid an accident would
be a worthwhile strategy.
The theme of individual responsibility that leads jurors
to scrutinize plaintiffs for fault can also be applied to a
personal injury defendant. If jurors view plaintiffs as avoiding
personal responsibility by bringing lawsuits, so too might
jurors come to view defendants as avoiding responsibility by
fighting a reasonable request for compensation. The factual
circumstances that support defendant control and
responsibility, along with the possible steps that a defendant
could have taken to avoid an accident, underscore the extent of
the defendant's culpability for the untoward event. Negative
dispositional attributions about the character of the defendant
may flow from the facts and circumstances of the case. As some
persuasion scholars maintain, "[p]ersuading jurors to make
this type of dispositional attribution increases the likelihood of
significant damages."129 If Tom's lawyer can succeed in showing
Elaine's lack of care and irresponsibility, the tendency to blame
the injury victim should decrease.
A plaintiffs attorney may want to establish common
ground between the jurors and the plaintiff,3 ' for example, by
emphasizing that a plaintiffs attitudes and background are
similar to those of the jurors.' Shaver's research 32 and
129 Id. at 92.
130 HERBERT W. SIMONS, PERSUASION: UNDERSTANDING, PRACTICE AND
ANALYSIS 157-167 (1976).
"' GARY C. WOODWARD & ROBERT E. DENTON, JR., PERSUASION AND
INFLUENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE 167 (2d ed. 1992).
132 Shaver, supra note 47, at 101-13.
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Burger's research, discussed earlier,"3 suggest that jurors could
be more lenient toward people who are similar to themselves.
Arguably, then, the best jurors for the plaintiff may be those
who have already been victims of a car accident because they
will not want to blame themselves for their accident."' Another
tack is to search for jurors with similar backgrounds or
experiences. As noted above, Hans and Vadino's study found
that respondents with whiplash were more likely to believe
that whiplash victims were actually injured.' 5 Muzafer Sherif
and Carl Hovland's classic observation from social judgment
theory posits that people make social judgments based on
anchors or reference points.' 6 Personal experience can provide
a powerful anchor or reference point that a litigator could
employ to make a persuasive argument.
In terms of structuring the argument, the plaintiffs
attorney will probably be more persuasive when using a two-
sided message with refutation rather than a one-sided
message.'37 For example, suppose Elaine was momentarily
distracted by her children fighting in the back seat of the car
just before the accident. Elaine's situation highlights the
accidental quality of the event and also diminishes an
observer's perception of Elaine's personal control. Indeed, as
Professor Sharon Lamb pointed out to us, the woman could be
seen as acting as a good mother, doing the best she could to
handle her important parental responsibilities.'38 The plaintiffs
attorney might be tempted to ignore or downplay Elaine's
excuse. However, the attorney would be better off by
acknowledging Elaine's defense that her children's fighting
distracted her, and then refuting her argument by pointing out
133 See Burger, supra note 66.
134 VINSON, supra note 69, at 101. Vinson makes the argument that a defense
attorney in an auto accident case would want jurors who believe that a similar accident
could happen to them. Donald Vinson explains that, "[clonsistent with defensive
attribution theory, a juror who thinks he or she could personally have such an accident
will possess a deep need to rationalize the situation" and blame the victim. Id. Vinson
further explains that during voir dire, defense attorneys should focus on the key
question of whether prospective jurors believe that such an accident could have
happened to them, and put those who believe it could have on the jury. Id.
135 Hans & Vadino, supra note 14, at 575.
136 MUZAFER SHERIF & CARL I. HOVLAND, SOCIAL JUDGMENT: ASSIMILATION
AND CONTRAST EFFECTS IN COMMUNICATION AND ATTITUDE CHANGE (1961).
137 ADVANCES, supra note 106, at 93.
138 Sharon Lamb, Remarks at the Brooklyn Law School Center for the Study
of Law, Language & Cognition Symposium, Responsibility & Blame: Psychological and
Legal Perspectives (Oct. 18, 2002). For an interesting discussion of mothering and
responsibility attribution, see Lamb, supra note 36, at 945-48.
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her irresponsibility in failing to pull over to stop their
fighting.'39 And, of course, all lawyers know that choice of words
can be crucial, so the plaintiffs lawyer may be drawn to words
with highly visual negative imagery, such as "smashed" and
"struck," rather than the more benign "hit" and "bumped."40
The omnipresence of the individual responsibility ethic
among jurors suggests that the theme of personal control will
figure importantly in jurors' perceptions of the accident.
Emphasizing the plaintiffs lack of control, as well as the
actions and choices that the defendant made that led to the
accident, is a potentially fruitful way to have the individual
responsibility ethic work for, rather than against, the plaintiff.
C. Communicating the Severity of a Whiplash Injury
The widespread media coverage of insurance fraud,
coupled with tendencies to minimize injuries and derogate
plaintiffs, make challenging the presentation of a convincing
case of injury, particularly when the injury is not readily
visible, as with whiplash and other soft-tissue injuries.
Establishing and emphasizing the impossibility or low
likelihood of fraud, either by referring to the plaintiffs personal
characteristics or to external confirmations of the injury, is an
essential first step.
Plaintiffs' attorneys have made many suggestions for
the more effective presentation of a whiplash client's case.
Concerned by the aura of fraud and triviality surrounding the
term whiplash, plaintiffs' attorneys have proposed alternative
words to convey the injury. One favorite recommendation is
that attorneys use the term "connective-tissue" injury because
of its medical connotation. Of course, the use of this term is
likely to be one-sided, particularly if the defense uses other
"9 In the adversarial context, people have information about opposing
arguments; therefore, a two-sided message with refutation is more effective. RICHARD
M. PERLOFF, THE DYNAMICS OF PERSUASION 167 (1993).
140 Elizabeth F. Loftus and John C. Palmer showed subjects a film of a multi-
car accident. After seeing the film, the researchers asked the subjects one of two
leading questions: "About how fast were the cars going when they smashed into each
other?" or "About how fast were the cars going when they hit each other?" If Loftus and
Palmer asked the question using the word "smashed," they found that subjects
estimated that the cars were going faster, and they also reported seeing broken glass at
the accident scene despite the fact that none was shown in the film. Elizabeth F. Loftus
& John C. Palmer, Reconstruction of Automobile Destruction: An Example of the




words, such as whiplash or soft-tissue injury, to minimize the
perceived injury or connote fraud. Furthermore, focus group
discussions of whiplash cases show that many people do not
have a firm grasp of the meaning of connective-tissue injury,
whereas whiplash, and even the prosaic "neck injury," are more
understandable.14' The national poll on perceptions of personal
injury showed that people rated a neck injury as more serious
than soft-tissue injury, connective-tissue injury and
whiplash.4 1 Whether simply changing the injury label used by
one side without any other trial modifications would be
effective is unknown.
Other plaintiffs' attorneys are worried, and reasonably
so, that jurors will not grant credibility to whiplash claims if
there is only minimal damage to the vehicle in a car accident
and no strikingly visible physical deformity on the plaintiff.
They have searched for concrete analogies to whiplash injuries.
One is the "egg carton" analogy. It is a common experience for
all of us to get an unblemished egg carton that nonetheless
contains one or more broken eggs. Similarly, the more sensitive
muscles and tissue surrounding an accident victim's bones can
be injured even though the vehicle's impact does not leave a
dent. A migraine headache is also analogous to whiplash in the
sense that it can produce devastating pain although there is no
external visible sign of the pain during a migraine.
Finally, plaintiffs can draw on psychological principles
in effectively framing the injury's worth for the jury.'
Experimental studies find that "selling price" approaches to
asking juries what an injury is worth generate higher
recommended awards than "making whole" approaches. That
is, if we ask jurors to consider how much money they would
want for selling their good health, the amount is considerably
larger than if we ask how much a plaintiff needs to receive to
buy back her good health, to be made whole again after an
injury.14
In sum, effective communication of the validity and
severity of injury may include confronting the possibility of
plaintiff fraud directly, modifying terminology, using apt
analogies and incorporating insights from framing theory.
14' Hans & Vadino, supra note 14.
142 See Hans, supra note 26.
14' Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on
Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995).
' Id. at 1353-54.
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CONCLUSION
The research summarized in this Article shows that
psychological, social and political factors as well as media
coverage tend to encourage observers and civil jurors to search
for fault in personal injury plaintiffs and, most acutely,
whiplash plaintiffs. A plaintiffs attorney will have a better
chance of prevailing in a whiplash case by seeking common
ground between the jurors and the plaintiff; looking for jurors
with whiplash experience; underscoring the plaintiffs lack of
personal control over the accident; directly addressing
presumptions about the plaintiffs blame; and emphasizing the
theme of the personal responsibility (or irresponsibility) of the
defendant.
Effective communication of the severity of a whiplash
injury might best be accomplished by referring to the whiplash
injury as a "neck injury" rather than whiplash or connective-
tissue or soft-tissue injury, which are mystifying terms to most
people; focusing on concrete ways in which the neck injury has
done serious damage to the plaintiffs quality of life, providing
both emotional and rational appeals and using effective
analogies to whiplash (such as the egg carton or migraine
metaphors). Framing can also be used to convey the full worth
of the injury.
Some open questions remain about the causes of
plaintiff blame in personal injury trials, particularly those
involving whiplash and other soft-tissue injuries. Are the
psychological motivations described above likely to be the
prime causes of derogation of plaintiffs who bring lawsuits? Are
jurors simply less willing to compensate because of the low
severity of the injuries? Are the readily available media
examples of fraudulent claims so powerful that they trump
plaintiff evidence of injury?
Then, too, there is the problem of prediction. When
attorneys look to research in the areas of psychology
(attribution theory) or communication (persuasion theory) to
inform their approaches to arguing civil cases, they are no
doubt aware that research in both disciplines can point in a
general direction with broad strokes, but cannot predict with
absolute certainty how twelve individual jurors will decide a
particular case. Nonetheless, the literature reviewed here
provides some specific ideas for how to present an injury
victim's case. We hope that the theoretical literature will guide
the design of finely tuned empirical studies on jurors'
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perceptions of plaintiffs and more effective methods for the
presentation of their injuries.
